By Salm Jasim.
The anticipated agreement between Iran and the United States opens the door to a radical transformation in the political, security, and geopolitical equations of the Middle East. This diplomatic breakthrough does not erase historical and strategic disputes; rather, it shifts conflicts from direct military confrontation to a more complex arena, where economic competition and the struggle to control transit corridors intertwine with ideological and security structures. From Tehran’s strategic perspective, this agreement does not mean accepting a new shared system or ending its conflict with Washington. Instead, it is viewed more as a tactical opportunity for a respite and reorganization, aimed at reviving its domestic economy through the lifting of sanctions, without abandoning its constant strategy of attempting to weaken and expel US forces from the region. Naturally, this transformation will rest on highly unstable ground, as the fragile nature of the agreement and the possibility of political changes within the US constantly pose the risk of a sudden collapse.
Regional Policy and Economic Maneuvering
In this context, Iran’s regional policy will witness a tactical shift, as Tehran moves toward integrating military power with commercial influence. Maintaining its network of proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen remains an unalterable ideological and security foundation. Tehran will never trade this deep strategy for a temporary commercial card; instead, it views it as the main pillar of its preemptive defense and its national-sectarian project. However, what will change is the method of managing this influence. After the lifting of sanctions, due to the devastation of its economic infrastructure, hyperinflation, and its absolute need for foreign capital, Tehran will not be able to participate in the reconstruction of the region as an independent investing country. Instead, Tehran’s strategy will focus on institutionalizing its influence. This will be implemented by interconnecting electricity grids and gas pipelines, and by securing official contracts for companies affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within the state apparatus of Iraq, as well as in the new phase of Syria, to obtain a kind of legal and official status. Undoubtedly, implementing this on the ground will require the financial and technological support of giant Chinese companies to fill Iran’s financial gaps.
Internal Iranian Dynamics
This external shift will create a fierce conflict within Iran between the diplomatic wing and the military wing, especially since the military wing finds its survival in chaos and instability. Simultaneously, the process will be a severe test of the Islamic Republic’s domestic legitimacy. If the unfrozen revenues are allocated solely to fill the coffers of military institutions and fund the “Resistance Front” instead of improving the people’s livelihoods, the hidden flames of discontent in the Iranian street will flare up further, and the consequences will heavily impact the system’s survival.
The Strait of Hormuz and International Corridors
On the other hand, the equation of the Strait of Hormuz will acquire a new definition. If Iran officially sells its oil, maintaining maritime security in this corridor will become a direct financial interest for the country. Hence, Hormuz will transform from a threatening weapon into a negotiating shield to prevent Washington from violating the agreement. This situation opens the door to dialogue with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but maintaining regional balance cannot be guaranteed merely by unfrozen funds; it is tied to Iran’s level of compliance with the technical conditions related to temporarily limiting uranium enrichment. This is a tactical compromise that Tehran uses as a maneuver to reduce the fears and concerns of the Gulf states, while preserving its fundamental capabilities and nuclear expertise as a latent nuclear-threshold state.
In this competition, international efforts will intensify to reduce the geopolitical weight of the Strait of Hormuz through mega-projects such as the Development Road and connecting the Middle East to Europe and the West. However, the real struggle is not merely on maps and paper; it is decided by the political and security will of local forces. In Iraq and Syria, the equation does not end solely with the desires of Tehran and Washington. The conflicts of national forces, sectarian and ethnic components, along with the control of strategic crossings like Al-Bukamal and Al-Tanf, can paralyze the largest foreign economic projects if local interests are not considered.
The Position of the Kurdistan Region
In this complex landscape, the position of the Kurdistan Region in the post-agreement phase with Iran is not confined to a narrow economic framework; for Tehran, it remains a frontline of national security. This is due to the presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition forces and Tehran’s fear of rival intelligence infiltrating the area. Hence, maintaining the balance, constitutional status, and political entity of the Kurdistan Region acts both as a barrier against absolute geopolitical monopolization in northern Iraq and as a center of gravity for balancing the deep security conflicts between Tehran and Erbil to avoid any undesired repercussions.
The Perspectives of Regional and Global Powers
Israel’s Stance
On another front, Israel views the signing of this agreement as granting official legitimacy to Iran’s regional standing and implicitly recognizing Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. For Tel Aviv, this is a major and unacceptable threat. Although Israel’s deep strategic reliance on Washington makes it difficult to enter a prolonged military war without US coordination, Israel’s security principles are never built on temporary reactions or waiting for threats; rather, they rely on a strategy of preemptive strikes. Tel Aviv will not only attempt to disrupt the financial aspects of the agreement through its lobbies in Congress but will also escalate the strategy of “war in the margins of a ceasefire” (where military and intelligence operations continue even when a ceasefire is declared) into a new, more intense phase. Therefore, the possibility of conducting deep sabotage operations inside Iran’s nuclear facilities and targeting the positions of its armed groups in Lebanon and Iraq remains a constant likelihood, regardless of whether Washington has given a green light.
China and Russia’s Calculations
On the international level, China’s warm reception of this agreement stems from the importance of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative to ensure the continuous flow of energy. However, Beijing constantly monitors the situation to ensure it does not lead to absolute US naval dominance in the region. Unlike China, Russia finds itself facing a negative equation. Moscow, which shares a tight military and drone partnership with Tehran, views Iran’s official return to the energy market as a threat to its own position in the gas and oil markets, as it weakens Moscow’s leverage cards against the West. Consequently, Russia will try to maintain a level of controlled tension through its influence in the region to prevent Tehran’s complete integration into the Western financial system.
Turkey’s Dilemma
Meanwhile, Turkey is caught between the logic of national security and economic interests. Although Iran’s reopening opens the door to a new market for Ankara, from the perspective of political realism, national security always precedes commercial relations. A reduction in international pressure on Tehran would give Iran’s proxy forces a freer hand in disputed areas such as Sinjar, Nineveh, and northern Syria. This will prompt Turkey to militarily confront Iranian influence fiercely, even if they maintain good commercial relations.
A New Cold War
Ultimately, the agreement between Washington and Tehran does not mean an end to historical conflicts; rather, it is a redesign of the game’s format on the Middle Eastern chessboard. The region is not heading toward peace but is entering a new Cold War phase, where ideological struggles, preemptive strike strategies, and the war over commercial corridors interact together. Success in this new reality belongs not merely to the side possessing more advanced weapons or greater wealth, but to the power that can skillfully create a balance between economic needs, the will of local forces, and the state apparatuses of the region’s countries. The Middle East, following this agreement, will not become a quiet region; instead, it will become an arena for a silent, complex, and covert competition where economy, weapons, and ideology serve as shared tools for mapping the new boundaries of influence and power.
